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LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
The Visual Artists Rights Act
Introduction
On December 1, 1990, President Bush signed into
law the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990.' This
legislation amends the Copyright Act of 19762 to
recognize the moral rights inherent in paintings,
drawings, prints, sculptures, and still photographic
images produced for exhibition purposes only.3 The
concept of moral rights ("droit moral") was devel-
oped in eighteenth-century France and is com-
monly referred to as an artist's personal right to
control his or her creation. Thus, an artist can
possess two fundamental rights in an artistic cre-
ation: (1) pecuniary; and (2) personality. The pecu-
niary right invested in a work of art is protected by
the Copyright Act and a host of state statutory and
common law concepts in property and contract law.
The personality right inherent in an artistic cre-
ation will now be protected by the Visual Artists
Rights Act.
This update will first explore the background of the
Visual Artists Rights Act. Additionally, the sub-
stance of the legislation and possible ambiguities
will be addressed. Finally, the conclusion will set
forth the probable impact that this statute will have
on our society.
Background of the Visual
Artists Rights Act
Congress 4 and state legislatures 5 have debated the
enactment of moral rights legislation for over one
hundred years. However, the turning point of the
moral rights struggle occurred in the midst of con-
gressional debate over the United States' adher-
ence to the terms of the Berne Convention.6 The
main focus of debate was the scope of article 6L of
the Berne Convention which states, in part, that
'the author shall have the right to authorship of his
work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudi-
cial to his honor or reputation."7 Congress deter-
mined that the Berne Convention was not a self-ex-
ecuting treaty and therefore article 6!, of the Berne
Convention had no legally binding effect in the
United States.8Thus, for a moral rights doctrine to
have any force in the United States, separate legis-
lation needed to be implemented. On December 1,
1990, legislative implementation of the moral
rights doctrine began with the enactment of the
Visual Artists Rights Act.
Substance of the Visual
Artists Rights Act
The Visual Artists Rights Act consists of nine sec-
tions which amend the Copyright Act. Three of the
most significant additions to the Copyright Act will
be discussed: (1) Work of Visual Art Defined; (2)
Rights of Attribution and Integrity, including the
scope and exercise, duration, and transfer and
waiver of these rights; and (3) Preemption.9
Work of Visual Art Defined
Section 602 of the Visual Artists Rights Act amends
section 101 of the Copyrigbt Act by inserting the
definition of "works of visual art."'0 This definition
includes still photographic images produced for
exhibition purposes only, paintings, drawings,
prints, or sculptures." The definition also sets forth
a list of visual drawings that are not to be consid-
ered "visual art. '12 Moreover, moral rights protec-
tion is to be extended to either one of a kind cre-
ations, or limited editions of 200 copies or fewer
which are signed and consecutively numbered by
the author."
Although Congress intended to narrowly define
"visual arts," it has left many of the terms illus-
trated as "visual arts" vague and ambiguous. For
example, it is unclear whether the term sculptures
includes pottery or furniture;14 whether paintings
include murals on buildings;15 or whether prints
include lithographs, serigraphs, etchings, and the
like.17 Likewise, it is unclear whether Congress
intended to treat the term "photographic images
used for exhibition purposes only" broadly or nar-
rowly.
Furthermore, Congress neglected to state whether
all standards of artistic quality should be protected.
The Act does not limit the definition of visual arts
to only those visual arts that are famous or that
have reached a certain level of recognition. How-
ever, it is unsettled whether Congress desires to
protect children's drawings or arts and crafts that
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are created by "non-artists." The only hint of what
standard of quality might be applied was set forth
by Representative Brooks in congressional hear-
ings: The court should use common sense and
generally accepted standards of the artistic com-
munity in determining whether a particular work
falls within the scope of the definition."18 Although
this "common sense" standard provides courts with
some guidelines, it is hardly definitive enough in
considering the scope of objects and drawings that
arguably fall within Congress' definition of "visual
arts."
Scope and Exercise of the Rights of
Attribution And Integrity
Once it has been determined that a work falls
within the definition of "works of visual art," the
author is entitled to the rights of attribution and
integrity.19 Section 106A(a)(1) creates a right of
attribution that extends not only to the right to be
identified as the author of a work, or to prevent use
of the author's name when he or she is improperly
identified as the author of a work, but also to the
right to publish anonymously or under a pseud-
onym.20 Similarly, section 106A(a)(2) provides that
an author shall have the right to prevent the use of
his or her name in connection with a work of visual
art that has been modified in a way that would
violate the right of integrity stated in section
106A(a)(3).2 1 Additionally, section 106A(a)(3) pro-
vides for a right of integrity which allows an artist
to "prevent any intentional or grossly negligent
destruction, distortion, mutilation or other modifi-
cation of a work which would be prejudicial to his
or her honor or reputation....
22
It is clear that an author of a work of visual art may
bring a cause of action against anyone, including
the owner of the pecuniary copyright of the work,
for "any destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudi-
cial to his or her honor or reputation, and which is
a result of an intentional or negligent act or omis-
sion with respect to that work."23 However, three
questions may be raised regarding this standard:
(1) what is meant by "honor or reputation;" (2) what
is meant by "intentional or negligent acts;" and (3)
what is meant by "any destruction, distortion, mu-
tilation, or other modification?"
Although the term "reputation" has an historical
place in American jurisprudence, the term "honor"
will be newly born into our legal system as a result
of this act. In order to guide courts in determining
whether an artists honor or reputation has been
prejudiced, the Judiciary Committee commented
that the term "honor and reputation" should be
construed to focus on:
[T]he artistic or professional honor or repu-
tation of the individual as embodied in the
work that is protected. The formulation for
determining whether harm to honor or repu-
tation exists must of necessity be flexible.
The trier of fact must examine the way in
which a work has been modified and the pro-
fessional reputation of the author of the
work. Rules 701-706 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence permit expert testimony on the
issue of whether the modification affects the
artist's honor or reputation. While no per se
rule exists, modification of a work of recog-
nized stature will generally establish harm
to honor or reputation. 24
Once an author establishes harm to honor or repu-
tation, he or she must then prove injury by a negli-
gent or intentional act or omission. Legislative his-
tory of the Act indicates that a particular state of
mind is not required.2 Therefore, actions such as
unintentionally and unknowingly leaving an oil
painting in a humid room might be considered a
negligent act.
A determination of what is meant by "any destruc-
tion, distortion, mutilation, or other modification"
is equally perplexing. Although the Visual Artists
Rights Act affords a broad reading of the right of
integrity, the Act provides for exceptions which
might undermine the force of this right. Modifica-
tions of a work of visual art which are the result of
the passage of time, the inherent nature of the
materials involved,2 6 conservation, or public pre-
sentation, unless caused by gross negligence, are
not considered a destruction, distortion, mutila-
tion, or other modification.2 7
Duration of the Rights of
Attribution and Integrity
The Visual Artists Rights Act sets forth two stan-
dards regarding the duration of the rights to attri-
bution and integrity. First, artists who will create
works on or after June 1, 199128 will possess the
rights of attribution and integrity for a term con-
sisting of the life of the author.2- Second, artists who
have created works ofvisual art before June 1, 1991
and who have not transferred title to those works
will enjoy moral rights protection for the length of
their life plus fifty years.30 In the case of a jointly
authored work, the rights of attribution and integ-
rity will endure through the life of the last surviving
author.3 1 The distinction between the duration of
rights afforded to works created before and after
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June 1, 1991 is significant because artists who
created a work of art before the effective date of the
Visual Artists Rights Act are granted 50 additional
years of moral rights protection. It is likely that this
separation will be the subject of confusion and
dispute as courts begin to hear cases involving
moral rights claims.
Transfer and Waiver of the Rights of
Attribution and Integrity
Although an author may waive his or her moral
rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act, he or she
may not transfer them. The waiver provision allows
the artist to disregard specific actions by a third
party that, in the absence of the waiver, would
violate the law.33 However, a waiver applies only to
the specific person to whom the waiver is made.34
That person may not subsequently transfer the
waiver to a third party.35 If a party wishes to obtain
a waiver, he or she must do so directly from the
author.3 6 Further, if a work is created by two or
more authors, the consent to waive by one author
will waive the moral rights of the other authors as
well.3 7
The effect of allowingmoral rights to be waived may
be significant. A waiver provision creates the possi-
bility that an author may be forced to forfeit his or
her newly granted moral rights. Thus, "given the
bargaining power of most authors, the waiver or
transfer of moral rights would soon appear as
boilerplate in all contracts." At the very least, a
waiver provision may lessen the effect of the
author's moral rights. At the most, it could com-
pletely destroy the moral rights that Congress has
so vigorously fought to acquire.
Preemption
Section 605 of The VisualArtists Rights Act amends
section 301 of the Copyright Act by setting forth
that, after June 1, 1991, the newly created section
106A, which outlines the right of attribution and
integrity, preempts all state moral rights laws.3 9
For preemption to occur, two criteria must be met.
First, the original work sought to be vindicated
under state law must be fixed in a tangible medium
of expression and fall within the definition of "vi-
sual art." Second, the rights must be equivalent to
the legal -or equitable rights embodied in section
106A.40 As the Register of Copyrights stated, "A
single Federal system is preferable to State stat-
utes or municipal ordinances on moral rights be-
cause creativity is stimulated more effectively on a
uniform, national basis."41
The preemption clause in the Visual Artists Rights
Act states that the Act preempts all "common law
or statutes of any State."42 However, the Act also
provides that "[n]othing...annuls or limits any
rights or remedies under the common law or stat-
utes of any State with respect to...activities violat-
ing legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent
to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with
respect to works of visual art."4 3 The language of
the Act seems ambiguous as to the scope of what
common law and statutes it intends to include.
Some states which have enacted moral rights leg-
islation provide protection to more than just photo-
graphic images, sculptures, paintings, and draw-
ings. 44 Thus, although it is clear that the Visual
Artists Rights Act preempts state law that protects
photographic images, sculptures, paintings, and
drawings, it is not entirely clear whether the Act
preempts state laws that protect "crafts, objects,
photographs, audio or video tape, film, or holo-
grams. 45
Conclusion
The enactment of the Visual Artists Right Act of
1990 will enable American artists to direct and
control the destiny of their reputation and will
ensure that the children of the next generation will
have something by which to judge and understand
our current culture. Although the Act has been
purposefully drafted to effect only a small portion
of the art world (i.e. only works of "visual art" as
defined in the statute), and contains some loopholes
and ambiguities, it is nonetheless a step in the right
direction. Hopefully, Congress will eventually rec-
ognize the need to preserve books, films, and com-
puterized art technology as well. 9
Zena Shuber
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